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Measuring Network Security Using Bayesian Network-Based Attack
Graphs
Marcel Frigault
Given the increasing dependence of our societies on networked information systems, the
overall security of such systems should be measured and improved. Recent research has
explored the application of attack graphs and probabilistic security metrics to address this
challenge. However, such work usually shares several limitations. First, individual vulner-
abilities' scores are usually assumed to be independent. This assumption will not hold in
many realistic cases where exploiting a vulnerability may change the score of other vulner-
abilities. Second, the evolving nature of vulnerabilities and networks has generally been
ignored. The scores of individual vulnerabilities are constantly changing due to released
patches and exploits, which should be taken into account in measuring network security. To
address these limitations, this thesis first proposes a Bayesian Network-based attack graph
model for combining scores of individual vulnerabilities into a global measurement ofnet-
work security. The application of Bayesian Networks allows us to handle dependency
between scores and provides a sound theoretical foundation to network security metrics.
We then extend the model using Dynamic Bayesian Networks in order to reason about
iii
the patterns and trends in changing scores of vulnerabilities. Finally, we implement and
evaluate the proposed models through simulation studies.
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We first introduce the background and motivation of the research. We then summarize the
main contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Our society has become increasingly dependent on the reliability and proper functioning
of a vast number of interconnected information systems. To improve the security of these
systems, it is necessary to measure the amount of security provided by different configura-
tions sincero» cannot improve what you cannot measure [19]. The aim of this research is
to develop a coherent, logical and applicable security metric for computer networks.
There exists considerable research and standard techniques for measuring individual
vulnerabilities, such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [7]. such scor-
ing systems typically derive a score based on known facts or experiences about a vulner-
ability (e.g., whether it can be exploited remotely, whether it requires an authenticated
user account, or whether an exploit of the vulnerability is widely available). However, by
considering vulnerabilities on an individual basis, a network security administrator could
be misled in a situation where the score of each individual vulnerability may be low but
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these vulnerabilities can be combined to compromise a critical resource which may lead to
catastrophic consequences.
More recent research has started to examine quantitative measurements of the overall
security of networks. One promising research direction is to employ the model of causal
relationships between exploits, namely, attack graph (AG) to model the overall security of
a network. Existing work along this direction include a general framework [48], a real-
valued metric [50], and a probabilistic metric [44]. These works draw strength from both
existing security scoring systems of individual vulnerabilities and the attack graph model.
More specifically, they combine the measurements of individual vulnerabilities obtained
from existing scoring systems into an overall score of the network. Such a combination
of scores is based on the causal relationships between vulnerabilities encoded in an attack
graph.
However, these existing works share several limitations. First, they usually combine
scores of individual vulnerabilities in an arbitrary manner, which prevents them from han-
dling situations where the exploitation of a vulnerability may affect the score of other
vulnerabilities. Successfully exploiting a vulnerability at a particular stage of an attack
sequence can affect the probability ofexploiting a vulnerability at a later stage in the attack
sequence. Second, the evolving nature of vulnerabilities and networks has largely been
ignored in most existing work. The threat posed by a vulnerability may change over time
in today's dynamic network environments. As more technical details of a vulnerability
become available, its exploitability or severity may need to be adjusted; when patches are
released by vendors to counter an exploit, the vulnerability may become less severe; on
the other hand, when exploit codes become more widely disseminated, the severity of a
vulnerability may increase. Therefore, it is insufficient to rate vulnerabilities with fixed
scores.
To address these limitations, this thesis employs a Bayesian Network (BN)-based attack
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graph to model the overall security of networks [13] and extends the model using Dynamic
Bayesian Networks (DBN) to address the dynamics in network security [14]. More specif-
ically, we first borrow the scores of individual vulnerabilities from the CVSS standard to
make the results more applicable in practice. We then show how to interpret attack graphs
as special BNs and DBNs and how to combine individual base scores of CVSS based on
their causal relationships. Through modeling AGs as special BNs, we provide a sound
theoretic foundation for developing probabilistic metrics. In addition, our BN model natu-
rally provides the capability for handling cases where the scores of vulnerabilities may be
affected by the exploitation of other vulnerabilities. We extend the BN-based model to a
DBN-based model in order to account for the dynamic nature of networks in which vul-
nerabilities' scores will evolve over time. The DBN model incorporates relevant temporal
factors, such as the availability of exploit code or patches, into an attack graph-based se-
curity metric. To demonstrate potential applications of the DBN-based model, we present
cases where either the Exploitability metric (E) or the temporal score (TS) of a vulnera-
bility is unobservable and can be inferred through reasoning with the model. Finally, we
implement and evaluate the proposed models through simulation studies.
Figure 1 shows a framework for applying the security metrics proposed in this the-
sis in order to improve the security of a network. This thesis will address specifically the
generation of annotated AGs, the generation of BN and DBN-based AGs, and the calcula-
tion of network security metrics. How to employ the computed metric results to modify a
network's current configuration in order to improve its security is a subject of our future
work.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
This thesis contributes to the field of network security metrics by proposing two novel








































Figure 1 : A Framework for Applying Security Metrics for Hardening Networks
contributions are as follows:
A novel Bayesian Network-based attack graph model is proposed to combine CVSS
scores for individual vulnerabilities into a single score for the whole network in a
static environment. This model can handle cases where vulnerability scores are not
independent and previous models will fail.
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• A novel Dynamic Bayesian Network-based attack graph model is proposed to com-
bine CVSS temporal scores into an indicator of dynamic patterns and trends of net-
work security. This is to our best knowledge the first known effort in quantifying the
dynamic nature of network security.
• A hybrid model that integrates an existing probabilistic security metric model with
the proposed BN-based model is devised. The resulting model will maintain the
added capability of the BN-based model while improving the computational effi-
ciency of the model.
• As one of the potential applications, the proposed DBN-based model may provide a
sound methodology for refining the CVSS temporal scores.
• Two tools, Polaris and Sirius, that implement the BN-based models, support the
analysis of these models and provide a practical tool for computing network security
metrics.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The organization of the remainder of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the state
of the art on attack graphs and probabilistic security metrics. Chapter 3 reviews basic con-
cepts ofAGs, CVSS, BN and DBNs, and probabilistic network security metric. Chapter 4
describes the BN-based attack graph model and the hybrid model. Chapter 4. 1 discusses
methods for assigning probabilities to individual vulnerabilities. Chapter 5 describes the
DBN-based attack graph model. Chapter 6 presents the Polaris and Sirius tools and simu-




Traditional vulnerability scanners [11] find known vulnerabilities in a network but they
cannot reveal how such vulnerabilities can be combined in a multi-step attack to infiltrate
a network. To qualitatively evaluate the security of a network against multi-step attacks, a
security analyst needs to take into account the effects of interactions between different vul-
nerabilities and find global security flaws. Traditional approaches to vulnerability analysis
of a network typically involve heavy human intervention by the so-called red team. First,
vulnerability scanners are used to identify vulnerabilities on individual hosts. Integrating
such identified vulnerabilities with other information about the network, such as connectiv-
ity between hosts, the red team produces sequences of attacks, namely, attack paths. Each
attack path leads to an undesirable state, such as a state where the intruder has administra-
tive accesses to a critical host. The red team approach heavily depends on the skills of the
team; the manual process is error-prone, tedious, and not scalable.
Early efforts on the defence against multi-step network attacks exist [8, 12,29,51]. The
general concept of attack tree is mentioned in [39] as trees with AND and OR for analyz-
ing the security of systems. An attack graph model is described in [33]. A tool is proposed
for building an attack graph using forward search in [42]. The inputs of an attack graph
include configuration files, attacker profiles, and a database of attack templates manually
6
created; the nodes of the attack graph are attack templates instantiated with particular users
and machines; edges are labelled by probabilities of success or cost of attacks. The attack
graphs are analyzed to find the shortest paths between given start and end nodes. A require
andprovide approach to automatic attack graph generation is first proposed in [43]. This
approach is later widely adopted in defending against multi-step attacks. Attack scenarios
can be generated by linking attack steps through their preconditions requirements and post-
conditions capabilities. Each successful attack helps attackers to gain more capabilities.
Model checking is first applied to the analysis of multi-step network attacks in [35]
where known vulnerabilities on network hosts, connectivity between hosts, and the initial
capabilities of the attacker together form states, whereas exploits form transitions between
states executed by attackers. Such a formal model is given to a model checker as the
input while the reachability in terms of given goal states as a query. The model checker
will produce a counterexample if there exists a sequence of exploits leading to the goal
states. Such a sequence of exploits indicates a potential attack path that must be broken in
order to secure the network. The authors of [36] provide more details on how connectivity
should be modeled at different layers and the term topological vulnerability analysis is
introduced. Later, model checking is used differently in [20,40], that is, to enumerate all
attack paths. A modified model checker applied to the finite-state machine created from
network information provides all counterexamples to a query stating the safety of goal
states, which are essentially the collection of possible attack paths. Analysis is possible
on such a model, such as finding a cut set in the attack graph so that goal conditions can
no longer be reached. The problem of finding the minimum attack leading to given goal
conditions is shown to be intractable.
To address the scalability issue of model checking-based approaches, a monotonie as-
sumption is adopted in [1] that states the further exploits will never cause the attacker to
relinquish any obtained privileges. Attack paths can be implicitly represented as paths in a
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directed graph; the latter includes exactly one copy ofeach exploit and its pre- and post con-
ditions, with edges to interconnect exploits to these conditions. This assumption reduces
the complexity of attack graphs from exponential in the number of hosts to polynomial. It
may also cause some attacks that may disable services or invalidate vulnerabilities impos-
sible to be included in the model. Attack graphs can be created with a two-pass search; the
first connects exploits by starting from the attacker's initial state, and then prunes those ir-
relevant states by searching backward from the goal state. Other analyses are also possible,
such as finding minimal attacks leading to given goal conditions. More recently, a logic
programming-based approach to attack graphs is given in [31]. The Datalog language is
used to encode knowledge about attacks in a network. MuIVAL [30] is a security analyzer
built from off-the-shelf tools, which can be used to retrieve information regarding software
and vulnerabilities. The engine takes as input the network configuration information and
outputs attack steps leading to the compromise ofthe network. The analysis has polynomial
complexity in the size of the network.
A treatment of the scalability issue of attack graph representation is given in [37]. A
hierarchical approach builds rules at every level of aggregation and then integrates them
through common attribute values of attack graph elements or attack graph connectivity.
Attack subgraphs are recursively collapsed into single vertices so that compression is pos-
sible to a certain degree. Moreover, the abstraction of protection domains is proposed to
reduce complexity when groups of machines have complete connectivity. A quadratic com-
plexity is claimed. Another effort applies a matrix clustering algorithm to the adjacency
matrix of attack graphs so the resulting adjacency matrix indicates the feature ofprotection
domain on the main diagonal [38]. Two other improvements to the representation of attack
graphs are given in [16]. A directed graph is used to model subnets as nodes and potential
inter-subnet attacks as edges. A dominator tree is used to determine whether inter-subnet
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and intra-subnet attacks are possible based on the domination relationships. Then, an ab-
straction reduces groups of exploits to virtual nodes so as to increase the readability of the
attack graph. Both methods may reduce the complexity of visualized attack graphs and
allow human users to quickly grasp imminent threats.
Recently, much interest has focused on quantifying the threat of potential multi-step
attacks. General reviews of security metrics are given in [4, 19,25]. The NIST's efforts
on standardizing security metrics are given in [27] and more recently in [41] and in the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [7]. Another overview of many aspects
of network security metrics is given in [17]. Dacier et al. gave intuitive properties that
should be satisfied by any security metric [8,9,29]. Based on the exploitability concept, a
qualitative measure of risk is given in [5]. The difficulty of attacks are measured in terms of
time and efforts spent by attackers. Founded on an exponential distribution for an attacker's
success rate over time, they use the Markov model and the MTTF (Mean Time to Failure)
to measure the security of a network. They discussed simple cases ofcombining individual
measures but did not study the general case. Another approach measures the relative risk
of different configurations using the weakest attacker model, that is the least conditions
under which an attack is possible [32]. Yet another series of work measures how likely a
software is vulnerable to attacks using a metric called attack surface [24]. These works
allow a partial order to be established on different network configurations based on their
relative security. The work by Balzarotti et al. [5] focuses on computing the minimum
efforts required for executing each exploit. However, the treatment of many aspects of
security is still qualitative in nature. For example, the resources are still treated equally
important (no explicit evaluation of damages) and the resistance to attacks is regarded as
binary (an attack is either impossible or trivial).
Relevant work exists in other areas, such as the study of trust in distributed systems.
Beth et al. proposed a metric for measuring the trust in an identity that has been established
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through overlapping chains of certificates [6]. The way they combine values of trust in
certificates into an overall value of trust proves to be useful in the study of security metrics.
Similarly, the design principles given by Reiter et al. are intended for developing metrics of
trust and we found these principles applicable to our study [34]. Structures similar to attack
graphs are used for risk analysis in safety-critical systems although the focus is not on vul-
nerabilities but on trust relationships [3]. Our model, used as a monitoring system, shares
similarity with the techniques for testing whether a finite execution of events generated by
a program violates a linear temporal logic (LTL) formula [15]. To generate attack graphs,
topological vulnerability analysis enumerates potential multi-step intrusions based on prior
knowledge about vulnerabilities and their relationships [35,40]. On the attack response
front, attack graphs have been used for the correlation of attacks, the hypotheses of alerts
missed by IDSs, and the prediction of possible future attacks [45,46,50].
Wang et al. [48] proposed a framework for using combining functions to determine
the combined effect of vulnerabilities in a network. They proposed the idea of using an
analogy to the resistance of electrical circuits in [49] and address the issue of additional
dependency between exploits although the solution is not entirely satisfactory since cycles
in attack graphs are largely ignored. Wang et al. also proposed a probabilistic network
security metric based on attack graphs [13, 14,44]. This work proposes the use of proba-
bility scores for each vulnerability to represent the likelihood that one attacker will exploit
the vulnerability or the percentage of attackers that successfully exploit the vulnerability.
Our work adopts this same concept but uses it to develop conditional probability tables for
each exploit and then demonstrates how the use of BNs can be used to determine network
security. The work on minimum-cost network hardening represents an early effort toward
the quantitative study of network security [47]. This work quantifies the cost of removing
vulnerabilities in hardening a network, but it does not consider other hardening options,
such as modifying the connectivity. It also has the limitation of adopting a qualitative view
10
of damages (that is, all the given critical resources are equally important) and of attack
resistance (that is, attacks on critical resources are either impossible or trivial).
The idea of using BNs to model network vulnerabilities and determine a quantitative
value representing the security of a network has been explored by Liu and Man [23]. A BN
is used to model all potential atomic attack steps in a network. Each vertex represents a
single security property violation state and each edge corresponds to an exploitation of one
or more exhibited vulnerabilities. They assign edge weights to represent the probability of
successful exploits. The difference between their work and ours will be detailed later in this
thesis. Our application of DBN is inspired by the work ofAn et al. [2] for privacy intrusion
detection. They employ DBN to relate a database operator's intention to observable factors,
such as the time spent on a certain operation. Our work is based on similar ideas but applies




To be self-contained, this chapter reviews the relevant concepts ofattack graphs, the CVSS
standard, BNs, DBNs, and a previous approach to a probabilistic network security metric.
3.1 Attack Graph
An attack graph (AG) models our knowledge about how multiple vulnerabilities may be
combined for an attack. The model represents system states using security-related condi-
tions, such as the existence of vulnerabilities on a host or the connectivity between hosts,
and state transitions using exploits of vulnerabilities. For the purposes of this thesis, an AG
is a directed graph with conditions and exploits as vertices, and their relationships as edges.
More formally, we have the following.
Definition 1 An attack graph G is a directedgraph G(E U C, Rx U R¿) where E is a set of
exploits, C a set ofconditions, and R1. Ç C ? E and R4 C E ? C.
The left-hand side of Figure 2 depicts a simple scenario where a file server (host 1)
offers the File Transfer Protocol (ftp), secure shell (ssh), and remote shell (rsh) services; a
database server (host 2) offers ftp and rsh services. The firewall only allows ftp, ssh, and
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rsh traffic from a user workstation (host 0) to both servers. The right-hand side depicts the
AG in which exploits of vulnerabilities are depicted as predicates in ovals and conditions
as predicates in clear texts. The two numbers inside the parentheses denote the source and
destination hosts, respectively. The AG represents three self-explanatory sequences of at-
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Figure 2: Network Configuration and Attack Graph
We make two assumptions. First, the AG of a given network can be obtained using
existing tools, such as the Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) system, which can
generate AGs for more than 37,000 vulnerabilities taken from 24 information sources in-
cluding X-Force, Bugtraq, CVE, CERT, Nessus, and Snort [18]. Second, the CVSS scores
of vulnerabilities in the given AG can be obtained from existing vulnerability databases,
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such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [28].
3.2 The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
The models proposed in subsequent sections will borrow scores assigned to individual
vulnerabilities according to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [7]. The
CVSS is an open and free framework that provides a means of assigning quantitative values
to vulnerabilities based on several metrics. The metrics are divided into three categories:
Base Scores, Temporal Scores and Environmental Scores. For the purposes of the work
presented in this thesis, only the Base and Temporal metric concepts will be considered.
3.2.1 Base Scores
The Base Score (BS) for each vulnerability quantifies its intrinsic and fundamental proper-
ties that are supposed to be constant over time and independent of user environments. The
Base Score ranges from 0 to 10 and is calculated based on the following six metrics:
• Access Vector - AV: This indicates the types of accesses required for exploiting the
vulnerability. Possible values are Local (numerical value 0.395), Adjacent Network
(0.646), and Network (1.0), which are all self-explanatory.
• Access Complexity - AC: A quantitative measure of the attack complexity required
to exploit the vulnerability. The range of values are: High (0.35), Medium (0.61) and
Low (0.71).
• Authentication - Au: A measure of the the number of times an attacker must authen-
ticate to a target in order to exploit a vulnerability. The defined range of values are:
Multiple (0.45), Single (0.56) and No (0.704).
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• Confidentiality - C: A measure of the impact on confidentiality following a suc-
cessful exploitation with the following defined range of values: None (0.0), Partial
(0.275) and Complete (0.660).
• Integrity - 1: A measure of the impact on integrity following a successful exploitation
with the following defined range of values: None (0.0), Partial (0.275) and Complete
(0.660).
• Availability - A: A measure of the impact on availability following a successful ex-
ploitation with the following defined range of values: None (0.0), Partial (0.275) and
Complete (0.660).
The CVSS Framework imposes the use of a vector which encodes the metric score
values used to compute the overall score for a vulnerability. The following is an example
vector:
AV : NIAC : L/Au : N/C : NfI :C/A:C
from which we can derive the numerical scores as indicated above.
The Base Metric score (BS) is computed as follows:
• Impact = IOAI*(1 — (1 — Conflmpact)*(l — Integlmpact)*(l — Availlmpact))
• Exploitability — 20 * AccessVector * AccessComplexity * Authentication
• f(impact) = 0 if Impact = 0, 1.176 otherwise
• BaseScore '= round_to_l_decimal((0.6 * Impact) + (0.4 * Exploitability) —
1.5) * f(Impact))
Using the example vector, the following demonstrates how to compute the BS:
• Exploitability = 20 * 1 * 0.71 * 0.704 == 9.9968
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• Impact = 10.41 * (1 - (1 - 0) * (1 - 0.660) * (1 - 0.660) == 9.2066
• f(impact) = 1.176
• BaseScore = round_io_ l_decima/((0.6*9.2066)+(0.4*9.9968)-1.5)*1.176 ==
9.4
3.2.2 Temporal Scores
The Temporal Score (TS) quantifies a vulnerability when considering properties of the
vulnerability that may change over time. The three temporal metric values used in CVSS
are:
• Exploitability - E: Indicates the current state regarding the availability of exploit
codes or techniques, with the following defined range of values: Unproven (0.85),
Proof-of-concept (0.90), Functional (0.95), High (1.00) and Not Defined (1.00).
• Remediation Level - RL: Indicates the current situation regarding the availability of
remediation solutions. The defined range ofvalues is: Official Fix (0.87), Temporary
Fix (0.90), Workaround (0.95), Unavailable (1.00) and Not Defined (1.00).
• Report Confidence - RC: Indicates the degree of confidence regarding the existence
of a vulnerability and the technical details. The range of defined values is: Uncon-
firmed (0.90), Uncorroborated (0.95), Confirmed (1.00) and Not Defined (1.00).
The Temporal Metric Score (TS) is computed as follows:
TS = roundjto_\_decimal(BS * E * RL * RC) (1)
For convenience, the following product is defined:
TGS =(E*RL* RC) (2)
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TS = roundJo_l_decimal(BS * TGS) (3)
Consider the example of a vulnerability with the above Base Score and the following
Temporal vector:
E : POC/RL : W/RC : C
The Temporal Score (TS) is calculated as follows:
• TGS = 0.90 * 0.95 * 1 == 0.855
• TS = 9.4 * 0.855 == 8.0
3.3 Bayesian Network (BN) and Dynamic Bayesian Net-
work (DBN)
BNs offer a compact means to encode the entire range of conditional relationships in the
system being modeled. A BN can be defined as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with
nodes representing variables and arcs representing conditional independencies among the
variables [26]. More formally, the BN for a system X can be formally described as a pair
B = (G, Q) where G is a DAG and Q is the set of parameters that quantify the network,
such as the conditional distribution values for each variable (node). The joint distribution
for a BN is represented by:
?
P(X1-Xn) = l[P(Xî\parents(Xi)) (4)
In [44], the notion of assigning to each node of an AG a probability value that rep-
resents the likelihood that one attacker or the percentage of attackers that will exploit the
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vulnerability was discussed. However, they do not employ BN as the basis of their model.
In this thesis, the same AG annotated with the individual probabilities will be used, but the
Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) for each node of the AG will be developed. The AG,
represented as a DAG, coupled with the CPT that encodes the conditional independencies
for all nodes will constitute a BN.
It is important to distinguish the BN-based AG used in this thesis from that of Liu et
al. [23]. Liu et al. represent each node of the graph as a host with a specific security
violation state, whereas in the AGs of this thesis, each node represents vulnerabilities as
well as the pre- and post-conditions resulting from the exploitation of such vulnerabilities.
Liu et al. assign probabilities to the edges, whereas this thesis assigns them to nodes.
While the probabilities for nodes can be readily obtained from widely available standard
measures such as CVSS, We believe probabilities to be assigned to edges are harder to
obtain in practice.
In contrast to BNs, DBNs are graphical models for probabilistic inferences in dynamic
domains that can enable users to monitor and update the system as time proceeds, and
even predict further behaviors of the system [26]. Today's networks are certainly dynamic
environments, and the security of such environments involves many temporal factors, such
as the availability of exploit code, the availability of patches or fixes, the confidence in
reported vulnerabilities, and so on. To incorporate such temporal factors in measuring
network security, this thesis extends the BN-based model to DBNs.
In a typical DBN model, the system is represented as a sequence of BNs. Each BN
represents a time slice of the DBN corresponding to a particular instant of time. As with
the BN, arcs exists between the vertices within each time slice. In addition, the DBN will
have arcs between certain vertices of successive time slices. For simplicity, it is generally
assumed that a DBN satisfies the Markovian property which implies that the state of the
system depends only on the previous state. In addition, it is assumed that the conditional
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dependencies among the vertices across the time slices are the same. Therefore, the system
can be modeled with only 2 time slices (more strictly speaking, the first 1.5 slices).
In DBNs, the vertices can be classified as either observable or unobservable. The value
of observable vertices are known apriori to the analysis process, whereas the values of
the unobservable variables are not available but may be inferred. In order to provide the
required links between the time slices, arcs can be introduced between a set ofunobservable
vertices and the necessary conditional probability distributions can be developed to encode
the relationships existing between successive time slices.
3.4 A Probabilistic Approach to Network Security Met-
ric [44]
We briefly introduce an existing probabilistic approach to combining scores of individual
vulnerabilities [44], which will be required in later discussions. With this approach, the
events that an attacker can (and will) execute different exploits will be assumed as inde-
pendent, and removing such an assumption will be an important contribution of this thesis.
Also, a fixed probability for measuring vulnerabilities is assumed.
The approach will associate each exploit e and condition c with two probabilities,
namely, p(e) and p(c) for the individual score, and P(e) and P(c) for the cumulative score.
The individual score p(e) stands for the intrinsic likelihood of an exploit e being executed,
given that all the conditions required for executing e in the given attack graph are already
satisfied. On the other hand, the cumulative score P(e) and P(c) measures the overall
likelihood that an attacker can successfully reach and execute the exploit e (or satisfy the
condition c) in the given attack graph.
For exploits, the individual score is assigned based on expert knowledge about the vul-
nerability being exploited. For conditions, it is assumed in this approach that the individual
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score of every condition is always 1. Intuitively, a condition is either initially satisfied or
immediately satisfied after a successful exploit (in practice, we can easily remove such
assumptions by assigning less-than-1 individual scores to conditions). It is proposed that
individual scores can be obtained by converting vulnerability scores provided by existing
standards, such as the CVSS base score and temporal score [7], to probabilities, although
no details are discussed.
Unlike individual scores, the cumulative score takes into account the causal relation-
ships between exploits and conditions. In an attack graph, such causal relationships may ap-
pear in two different forms. First, a conjunction exists between multiple conditions required
for executing the same exploit. Second, a disjunction exists between multiple exploits that
satisfy the same condition. The cumulative scores are defined in the two cases similar to
the probability of the intersection and union of random events. That is, if the execution of
e requires two conditions C1 and c2, then F(e) = P{c\) ¦ P(c2) · p(e); if a condition c can
be satisfied by either ex or e2 (or both), then P(c) = p(c)(P(ex) + P(e2) - P(ei) - P(e2)).
Definition 2 formalizes cumulative scores.
Definition 2 Given an acyclic attack graph G(E U C, Rn U Ri), and any individual score
assignmentfunction ? : E U C —» [0, 1], the cumulative scorefunction P : EU C —» [0, 1]
is defined as
• P(e)=p(e) -Uc^e)P(C)
• P(c) = p(c), ifRi(c) = f; otherwise, P(c) = p(c) ¦ ®eeßi(c)P(e) where the operator
f is recursively defined as ©P(e) = P(e)for any e e E and'©(Si U S2) = F-5? +
(BS2 — ©Si · ©S2 for any disjoint and non-empty sets Si C E and S2 Ç E.
Figure 3 illustrates the AG from Figure 2 but only includes the exploit nodes. The
individual probability scores for each node are shown in plaintext beside each node and the











Figure 3: Propagation of Probability Values
The cumulative scores of two exploits can be calculated as follows.
1. P(rsh{0} I)) = P(trust(0, 1) ? p(rsh(0, I)) = 0.8 ? 0.9 = 0.72
2. P(user(l)) = P{rsh{0, 1))+P(sshd_bof{0, 1))-P(rsh(0, l))xP(sshd_bof{0, 1))
0.72 + 0.1-0.72x0.1 = 0.748
The following can now be proposed as a definition of a network security metric:
Definition 3 Given an acyclic attack graph G(E U C, R1. U R1), any individual score as-
signmentfunction ? : EuC —> [0, 1], a cumulative scorefunction P : E U C ->¦ [0,1] and
a goal state g G C, the overall network security metric value (SM) is theprobability
SM = P(g = True) (5)
Using probabilities for a security metric has been criticized as violating a basic design
principle, that is, the value assignment should be specific and unambiguous rather than
abstract and meaningless [34]. However, there is a simple interpretation for the metric pro-
posed in this thesis. That is, the individual score p(e) is the probability that any attacker
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can, and will execute e during an attack, given that all the preconditions are already sat-
isfied. Equivalently, among all attackers that attempt to compromise the given network
during any given time period, p(e) is the fraction of attackers that can, and will execute e.
This interpretation of individual scores considers two factors in determining the indi-
vidual score p{e), namely, whether an attacker has the skills and resources to execute e and
whether he/she will choose to do so. For example, a vulnerability that cannot be exploited
remotely, or one that requires a valid user account will likely have a lower score due to the
first factor (that is, fewer attackers can exploit the vulnerability), whereas a vulnerability
that can be easily detected, or one less exposed to the public will likely have a lower score
due to the second factor (that is, fewer attackers will exploit the vulnerability).
The interpretation of individual scores also provides a natural semantics to the cumu-
lative scores. That is, P[e) or P(c) stands for the likelihood, or the fraction of, attackers
who will successfully exploit e or satisfy c in the given network. The cumulative score
of a given goal condition thus indicates the likelihood that a corresponding resource will
be compromised during an attack, or equivalently, among all attackers attacking the given
network over a given time period, the average fraction of attackers who will successfully
compromise the resource. Such a likelihood or fraction is clearly relevant in analyzing the
security of a network or in hardening the network for better security.
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Chapter 4
Bayesian Network-Based Attack Graph
This chapter proposes a BN-based attack graph approach to combining individual scores as
a measure ofthe overall security ofa network. We first discuss the assignment of individual
scores, and then introduce the model and apply it to several case studies.
4.1 Individual Score Assignment
In this section, we discuss how individual scores can be assigned with two different ap-
proaches.
4.1.1 A Simple Approach
An attack graph enumerates all possible sequences ofvulnerability exploitations leading to
a goal state. However, an AG is still qualitative in nature, and does not directly provide a
way to measure the security of a network. The approach we take in this thesis is to first
derive probability values for each exploitation of a vulnerability, and then use these values
to annotate the AG. The resulting graph will be referred to as an annotated attack graph.
The BN and DBN models developed later in this thesis are based on such an annotated
attack graph. We base the assignment of individual scores upon the CVSS standard [7]
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since it is widely accepted and the CVSS scores are readily available from many resources,
such as the NVD [28].
The first approach simply converts CVSS scores of a vulnerability to probabilities as
follows. First, we convert the score BS (or TS in the dynamic case) to a probability using
a simple approach of diving it by the domain size 10. We then associate this probabil-
ity to all the exploits that have this vulnerability (recall that an exploit is a vulnerability
bound to specific source and destination hosts). CVSS scores are proposed for quantifying
individual vulnerabilities only and ignore the causal relationships between exploits in the
context of a given network, which is modeled in attack graphs. Therefore, we define the
probability converted from a score as the conditional probability of an exploit when all of
its preconditions in the attack graph are already satisfied (by other exploits that imply those
conditions).
More formally, consider an attack graph G as a directed graph G(EuC, RrURi) where
E is a set of exploits, C a set of conditions, and Rr C C ? E and A¿ C E ? C are two
relations. The approach of this thesis regards each exploit as a binary variable that can take
discrete values of T (True), which signifies the exploit has been successfully performed
by the attacker, or F (False) indicating the converse. Given any exploit e 6 E, and its
corresponding score BS (or TS in the dynamic case), this proposal defines the Individual
Score Assignment Function used to assign the individual probability scores to each exploit
node of G as follows:
Definition 4 Given an acyclic attack graph G(EUC, RnURi) ande = T,F the Individual
Score Assignment Function ? : E U C —> [0, 1] can be defined asfollows:
p(e = T|Vc G Rr(e) c = T)= BSJlO (6)
For example, in Figure 2, we have P(rsh(0, 1) = T\trust(0, 1) = T) = BSrsh(o.i)/lO.
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Since the condition trust(0, 1) can only be satisfied by one exploit ftp_rhosts(0, 1), the
model can relate probabilities of the two exploits as P(rsh(0, 1) = T\trust(0, 1) = T) =
P(rsh(0, 1) = T\ftp_rhosts(0, 1) = T) = BSrshm)/10.
4.1.2 A Refined Approach
With the approach discussed in the previous section, we are essentially regarding the CVSS
base score assignment scheme as a blackbox. In this section, we shall take a closer look at
the internal structure of this scheme, and refine our previous approach accordingly.
As explained in Section 3.2, the CVSS Base Score is assigned based on metrics AV, AC,
Au, C, I, A. We discuss how these metrics would affect our individual score assignment as
follows.
• AV: The more remote an attacker can be from the target machine, the more likely a
vulnerability will be exploited since the number ofpotential attackers will be greater.
• AC: The lower the required access complexity, the greater the likelihood of attacks
becomes.
• Au: The stronger the authentication required for exploiting a vulnerability is, the
lesser the likelihood of attacks is.
• C, I, A: It can be argued that these three impact metrics have no direct relevance
to the determination of the likelihood of attacks since they measure the aftereffect.
However, they may in fact affect the likelihood ofexploitation in the following sense.
The greater the potential impact is, more attractive the vulnerability will be to an
attacker. Therefore, we believe that these impact metrics are also relevant to the
assignment of individual scores.
Therefore, the individual score, or the probabilistic values representing the likelihood
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of exploiting any particular vulnerability ? can be represented as a function of the six base
metric component scores:
P(V = T) = /(AV1AC, Au,C,I, A) (7)
In the previous section, we have implicitly defined /(AV, AC, Au, C, I, A) using the
equations provided within CVSS (with the division by 10). Upon a closer look, this ap-
proach has the following limitations. It cannot model the effect of an exploitation upon
subsequent exploitations of the same vulnerability. Logically, an attacker would employ
previously gained knowledge, skills, and tools to facilitate subsequent exploitations and
thus the probability of the latter would be greater. Moreover, other types of dependency
may also exist between exploitations, and the effect of such dependency may vary between
different base metric component scores. More specifically,
• AV Consider a situation in which multiple exploits exist on a single host and an
attacker must exploit them in a specific sequence to attain his objective. Clearly,
if some exploits require the same type of accesses, then we should not count such
accesses more than once since a gained access right will remain with the attacker.
Therefore, if the attacker has already gained the access required from an earlier ex-
ploit, we should compute an adjusted value for the current exploit, instead of simply
using the one provided by CVSS scores.
• AC: Similarly, in situations where multiple exploits exist on a single host and an
attacker must exploit them in a specific order, some exploits may reduce the access
complexity of subsequent exploits, and we should compute an adjusted value for the
latter instead of using the one provided by CVSS.
• Au: In this case, authentication measures required by different exploits form a hi-
erarchy. Certain exploits may require an authentication method that implies that an
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attacker will have the required credentials for subsequent exploits, an adjusted value
should be used for the latter.
• C2J1A1: We assume the C, I, and A metric scores of a vulnerability remains unaf-
fected by successful exploitations.
To compute adjusted probability scores for each AG node, two approaches are possible:
• Option 1 : Compute adjusted base score component metric values for each node of
the AG and then reuse the CVSS equations to recompute the base score metric (then
divide by 10).
• Option 2: Define new equations to compute the probability scores.
In this thesis, we will adopt the first approach and regard the second as future work.
More specifically, we define transformation functions for the adjusted base metric compo-
nent scores:
• AVI = oi(AVey. This transformation function adjusts the initial AV metric value
from CVSS by considering the network characteristics as follows. All predecessor
AG nodes (or ancestors) on the same host are examined through a backward search.
If a node has an AV metric equal to, or implies the access requirement of the node
being analyzed, then the transformation function should result in AV > AV. Later
in this section, we will describe an example of such transformation functions-.
• AC'e = ß(ACe): This transformation function adjusts the AC metric value from
CVSS by determining to what degree the attacker has acquired knowledge from ex-
ploiting previous vulnerabilities that will make this new exploitation easier (with less
complexity). Again, we will discuss an example later in this section.
27
• Au'e = p(??,e): This transformation function adjusts the initial Au metric value
obtained from CVSS by considering if the attacker has already provided the same, or
implied, authentication credential during a previous exploit.
Definition 5 Given an acyclic attack graph G(E U C, R1. U Ri), the individual score as-
signmentfunction ? : E U C —» [0, 1] is defined as
p(e = T|Vc € Rr(e) c = T) = f(a(AVe), ß(ACe), 7r(Aue), Ce, Ie, Ae) (8)
Consider a simple example with two computers, host 0 and host 1, and assume that an
attacker has user access to host 0 (namely, condition cl(0)) and network connectivity to
host 1. Also, suppose host 1 is running services with vulnerabilities vl, v2 and v3. vl
can be exploited from host 0 to host 1 resulting in the post-condition c2(0, 1); v2 can then
be exploited resulting in c3(l); finally, v3 can be exploited, which is the goal state for the
attacker.
In this simple case, the base metrics component scores obtained from CVSS (divided
by 10) should be assigned to ? 1(0, 1) since it is the first exploit. For exploit i>2(0, 1) (and
similarly ?3(0, 1)), if the same access vector, access complexity or type of authentication
is already required by t/l(0, 1), then we set the value of AV, AC, or Au to be 1, which
is the greatest possible value, to indicate a dependency between these exploits. If ul(0, 1)
only meets partially the access requirements of f2(0, 1), then we can multiply the CVSS
scores for ^2(0, 1) (and similarly for ?3(0, 1)) by a user-defined value. Finally, if the access
requirements of ^1(0, 1) are completely different from those of ?2(0, 1) (and t>3(0, 1)),
then we should directly use the CVSS scores for the latter. This example of transformation
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Figure 4: Example of Transformation Functions
4.2 The Model
Our model takes as input an annotated AG G(EuC, RrURi) where each vertex is annotated
with a probability, or individual score, assigned according to Equation 6. We generate a
corresponding BN-based attack graph B = (G, Q). G is a directed graph corresponding
to the AG but with different semantics, that is, the vertices represent the binary variables
of the system and the edges represent the conditional relationships among the variables. Q
is the set of parameters that quantify the BN including the conditional distribution values
for each variable. The CPD tables can then be developed to propagate probabilities, or
cumulative scores, along the AG until reaching the goal condition.
The unique aspect of this BN representation is the following. In an AG, the causal
relationships between exploits can be disjunctive or conjunctive based on how they are
related through conditions [13]. Such relationships are represented in the BN representation
through special conditional probabilities of 0 or 1 . More specifically,
• We say a disjunctive relationship exists between any exploits e\, e.2, ¦ ¦ · , en with re-
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cRren+i is true. In such a case, the probability assignment based on Equation 6 will
satisfy P(en+1 = T\X) = 1 for all X that has e, = T hold for at least one j e [I, ?}.
• We say a conjunctive relationship exists between exploits ei, ß2, . . . , en with respect
to en+i when ejRiCj and CjRren+i both hold for all j = 1, 2, . . . , ? and some con-
ditions Cj's. In such a case, we have P(en+i — T\X) — 0 whenever X has ej = F
hold for at least one j G [l,n].
We illustrate the above concept through the study of several special cases. Presently
there exists no standard against which to evaluate the accuracy of the BN model proposed
in this thesis given the short history of research in this field and the lack of availability
of experimental data. One method that is available to provide a degree of evaluation of a
security metric model's accuracy is to establish how adequately the model handles intuitive
properties that any security metric should satisfy. The development of a comprehensive
list of such intuitive properties is left as a subject for future research, however, it will be
demonstrated in the following cases that the BN model proposed in this thesis can handle
a set of intuitive properties that any security metric should satisfy.
Case 1: el and e2 must be exploited in the given order.
In Figure 5, each node has been annotated with an individual score. As previously
mentioned, these scores are assigned based on CVSS and the scores for conditions are set to
1. Next, the CPT is generated for each node to encode the cumulative score. In this model,
the nodes are assigned discrete values ofT indicating that the exploit has been successfully
executed, or F indicating otherwise. For conditions, T indicates that the condition has
been satisfied, and F otherwise. The CPT allows for the calculation of the joint probability
function. The objective is to determine the probability of satisfying the goal condition
30
c3 = T. This can be calculated as follows:
cl















Figure 5: Case 1
Case 2: Either el or e2 must be exploited.
Figure 6 shows the second case where disjunctive relationship exists between two ex-
ploits. The probability of satisfying the goal condition c4 = T can be calculated as follows.
























Figure 6: Case 2
e3
c4
Clearly, the probabilistic score of case 2 is greater than that for case 1 . This satisfies the
intuitive property whereby a security metric should satisfy the concept that as more paths to
a goal state exist, the security of the network decreases. Thus this simple example validates
this notion and the use of the probabilistic score as a security metric.
Case 3: Both el and e2 must be exploited.
Figure 7 shows a case of the conjunctive relationship between exploits. The result in
this case is P(c5 = T) = 0.036. That is, the probability of achieving the goal state is
significantly less than in cases 1 and 2. This meets the intuition that it is now more difficult





















Figure 7: Case 3
c5
Case 4: A Successful exploitation affects other exploits with disjunctive relationships
In Case 2, exploits el and e2 are mutually independent, whereas in Case 4 shown in
Figure 8, the dotted line indicates that the likelihood of exploit e2 depends on exploit el. In
particular, an attacker may have gained knowledge and skills following exploit el, which
would increase his chances in exploiting e2. In Case 4, the likelihood of successfully
exploiting e2 without considering el is at 0.3 (same as in case 2), but this value will change
to 0.5 if the effect of el is considered. This will result from the recomputed BS score using
the adjusted scores for the AV, AC, Au, C,I and A parameters as described in section 4. 1 .2.










Figure 8: Case 4
value 0.204 as in Case 2. An interpretation of this result is that in order to exploit e3
we must have either a successful exploitation of el or e2. If el is successfully exploited
first, the likelihood of e2 increases. However, the attacker can go directly to e3 without
attempting to exploit e2 (in which case the adjusted score makes no difference), which is
the same as in case 2. If only e2 is exploited, then el can be ignored.
Case 5: A Successful exploitation affects other exploits with conjunctive relationships
The case shown in Figure 9 is similar to case 3 with the exception that el and e2 are
dependant in the sense that successfully exploiting el increases the likelihood of exploiting
e2. The result is 0.06 in this case. The calculation is simply based on the adjusted value of
e2, since el must always be exploited, which in turn means that e2 will always take on the
adjusted value.
4.3 Applying the Model
We now show how the model can be applied to handle some interesting cases. Consider
the two AGs in Figure 10. In the graph on the left, an attacker must exploit A or B, then
C and D in order to reach the goal state. The graph on the right differs slightly. In order to
achieve the goal state, an attacker must execute the same steps as those to the left. However,
if the attacker exploits A, he acquires knowledge that will make exploiting D easier. This
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Goal State
Figure 9: Case 5
is denoted by the score of 0.4 (when A is not exploited before reaching D) and 0.8 (when
A has been exploited before reaching D). The case can be modelled using the BN model as
shown in Figures 1 1 and 12. The probability scores for reaching the goal states are 0.0816
and 0.1296, respectively, which matches the aforementioned intuition.
Goal Slate Goal State
Figure 10: An Example ofApplying the Model
Figure 1 3 shows another example of applying the model. Using the propagation of
probabilities approach in Section 3.4, we would have P(CVE - 2006 - 5302(1, 2)) =





Figure 1 1 : Conditional Probability Tables for the Left Side Case
.8
Figure 12: Conditional Probability Tables for the Right Side Case
scrutiny, this method of calculation is valid only if trust(2, 1) and user(l) are mutu-
ally independent in which case P(trust(2,l)\user(l)) = P(trust(2, 1) = .5859 leads
to P(CVE - 2006 - 5302(1,2)) = .3433. However, this is clearly not the case. In
fact, our model will show P{trust{2, l)\user(l)) = .75 which yields P(CVE - 2006 -
5302(1, 2)) = .4395. Therefore, our model can deal with this case correctly while the
previous method is not sufficient.
Although our BN-based model is more general and can handle cases where the prob-
ability propagation method in Section 3.4 cannot, the latter can be more efficient in its
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Figure 13: Another Example of Applying the Model
very special structures. More specifically, we use special conditional probabilities of 0 and
1 to model the conjunctive and disjunctive relationships between exploits, while most other
conditional probabilities will not be useful in the modeling process. Therefore, a general-
purpose BN inference may not be as efficient as the probability propagation method that is
equivalent to a BN inference in special cases.
We thus propose a Hybrid model in which we combine the probability propagation
method in Section 3.4 with our BN-based method. More specifically, we search backward
from the goal condition in an AG to find subgraphs of the AG that are trees. We apply the
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probability propagation method to such subgraphs while adopting the BN-based method in
other cases, as illustrated in Figure 14.
Use BN Mode! to Evaluate
This Segment of the AG






As described in Section 3.2, CVSS provides several temporal metric scores in addition to
base metric scores in order to model the time variant factors in determining the severity of a
vulnerability. Such scores are, however, still intended for individual vulnerabilities and not
for the overall security of a network. The objective of this research is to evolve the afore-
mentioned BN-based model to a DBN model that can model the security of dynamically
changing networks. The temporal links between time slices of the DBN will be established
between the unobservable variables of the model. With these links, the model will enable
the inference of the unobserved variables based on the observed variables within the same
time slice and those of the previous slice of the DBN.
The model introduces three additional sets ofvertices into the previous BN model. The
first is the collection of E vertices that correspond to the Exploitability scores of the vul-
nerabilities. The second is the collection of RL vertices that correspond to the Remediation
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Level scores. Finally, the third is the collection of RC vertices that correspond to the Re-
port Confidence scores. These temporal metrics are defined in Section 3.2. The existing
exploit vertices will then carry the final metric score -Temporal Score TS (instead of the
BS in the static case), which has a similar role as the calculated scores in the case of the
static domain as described in Chapter 4. However, in the static domain, the final score for
an exploit is calculated based on its BS and the causal relationship between this exploit and
others, whereas in the dynamic domain, the final score of each exploit will depend on three
factors: the temporal score, the causal relationship between this exploit and others within
the same time slice, and the causal relationships with exploits in the previous time slice
(this will become clearer later with discussions using concrete cases).
Formally, given an attack graph G as a directed graph G(E U C, Rr U Ri), we define
Ee, Erl and ERc with the same cardinality as E to represent the set of E,RL and RC
nodes. We then obtain an enriched set of nodes as E' = E U EE U ERL U ERC. Let G' be
the directed graph corresponding to E' in which the relations R7. and R¿ remain the same.
Then we can have the one slice BN as a pair (G', Q) where Q represents the conditional
probabilities assigned as before. We then define a DBN as a pair (B0, Bd), where B0 defines
the prior P(Xi), and Bd is a two-slice temporal Bayes net(2TBN) that defines P(Xt\Xt-i)
by means of a DAG: P(X1[X^1) = ?^? P(X¡\parents(X¡)).
For B0, conditional probabilities are assigned in a similar way as in the static case
except that now the model uses the TS scores instead of the BS scores. More specifically,
the TS scores are derived as the product of BS and TGS using Equation 3. The derived
TS scores are then assigned as conditional probabilities based on Equation 6. For Bd, the
assignment of interslice conditional probabilities will depend on specific requirements of
applications, since different variables in a time slice may be regarded as unobservable, and
the effect of a previous slice will depend on the semantics of the variables in question. To
make the discussions more concrete, this thesis shall discuss cases to illustrate the potential
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of the model.
The use of the DBN attack graph model offers the possibility of using a rich repertoire
of DBN theory and advanced applications to allow researchers in the field of network se-
curity to solve network security problems such as, inferring node values, learning about
unknown (hidden) parameters based on observed characteristics of the network, determin-
ing most probable explanations (MPE) for the networks (ie. most probable explanation that
a particular set of nodes have been successfully exploited) and others.
5.2 Application 1 : Inference of Exploit Node Values
In this proposed application, we derive the probability values for the exploit nodes (the
TS scores) which represent the probability of successful exploitation. Recall, that the
values of these exploit nodes represents the probability that an attacker will exploit this
vulnerability. The capability ofdetermining the TS score for each vulnerability is of interest
(for example, to security administrators ofa network) and needs to be derived from the base
metric scores, temporal metric scores, intraslice and interslice dependencies. The model
for this application is illustrated in Figure 15. In the model, the observable criteria are
illustrated in the nodes with thin double lines and the unobservable criteria are illustrated
in the nodes with the single thick line.
The objective of this application is to infer the values of the exploit nodes at different
time intervals (time slices) based on observed criteria. In this case, a security administrator
can observe the E, RL and RC metric values for each exploit of the graph at each time
slice. Based on these observed values, the security administrator can use the model to infer
the probability values for each of the exploit nodes. In addition, the application can be
used to forecast future security characteristics of a network by integrating interesting work
by Jonsson et al. [21] in which the attacking phases within a network are defined. We














Figure 15: Inference of Exploit Node Values
infer the attacking phases based on the probability values computed from our model. Our
application could also be used within the framework discussed in the introduction section to
allow an administrator to establish a threshold value beyond which corrective actions must
be taken. By plotting the node values as a function of the time slices, the administrator
could make more effective decisions as to when corrective action should be taken.
Next we address the effect of a previous time slice on the present time slice as repre-
sented by the interslice arcs and the corresponding CPD. In the context of our model, the
interslice dependencies will be application dependant and thus be user defined values. We
introduce a variable r, namely, the Exploit Temporal Coefficient. We use t to adjust the
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TS score of an exploit in a time slice (i) based on whether or not the same exploit was
successfully exploited in the previous time slice (t — 1). In the case where an exploit has
been successfully exploited in a previous time slice, t will increase the TS score of the ex-
ploit for the present time slice. The possible value of t ranges from 1, where the successful
exploit of the vulnerability in a previous time slice has no effect on its TS score for the
present time slice, to 1/(BS * TGS), which will result in a TS value of 1 meaning that
once an exploit has been successfully exploited in a previous time slice, it will always be
considered exploited in subsequent time slices.
This latter case implies that an attacker never relinquishes acquired knowledge or capa-
bilities. This is reasonable when an attacker has compromised a vulnerability in a previous
time slice (e.g., successfully uploading a malware that provides user accesses on a remote
machine). In subsequent time slices, the attacker may retain this same remote access de-
spite the possibility of having the previous vulnerability fully patched. In such a case, the
interslice CPD assigning a TS value of 1 to an exploit node is appropriate. On the other
hand, changes to the temporal component metrics may affect the overall network secu-
rity in such a way that a previously possible exploit may become inaccessible (e.g., if the
RL factor was Temporary FL· in the previous time slice and it now becomes Official Fix).
Therefore, the user defined Exploit Temporal Coefficient (t) will allow our model to handle
different scenarios.
Definition 6 Given an acyclic attack graph G(E U C,Rr U Ri), we define a two-slice
temporal Bayes net(2TBN) (B0, Bd) based on a DAG in which arcs point from the set of
observable nodes O = {Ee,Erl, Erc} to the set of unobservable node U = {expl}.
Given a temporal coefficient TEi € [1, 1/(BSeì * TGSeJ], we assign inter-slide probabil-
ities as P(E\ = T I Ej-1 =T) = rE* BSE* * TGSE* and P(E¡ = T | E^1 = F) =
JdSeí ' i Gt>Ei-
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5.2.1 An Example
To security administrators, the score of each exploit is !inobservable, whereas the E, RL
and RC scores are observable for each vulnerability by consulting resources such as the
NVD [28]. To model the temporal dependencies between time slices, arcs linking the
time slices are introduced between the exploit vertices since they are unobservable. Our
objective is to infer their values and calculate the likelihood of attackers reaching the goal
state. For this example, we consider only the E and RL temporal metrics for simplicity.
Figure 16 shows the DBN model in this case through a toy example of two exploits. In
the model, the exploit vertices addusrphp and sunvect for this example are defined to be
conditionally dependant on their respective E and RL vertex values as represented graph-
ically in Figure 16. Note that it was decided not to include a node representing the Base
Score in this version of the model since it is a fixed value and is invariant throughout the
time slices. The model does, however, use the value of the Base Score as input into the
calculation of the TS score as shown in Equation 3. In the example, the value of exploit
sunvect is conditionally dependant on the value of exploit vertex addusrphp. This causal
relationship implies that vulnerability addusrphp must be exploited first in order for vulner-
ability sunvect to be exploited. In this example, the goal state is the successful exploitation
of vulnerability sunvect.
To model the temporal dependencies, arcs linking the time slices are introduced be-
tween addusrphp and sunvect (unobserved parameters). To complete the model, it is nec-
essary to develop the CPDs for the intraslice relationships (within the same time slice) and
the interslice relationships (from one time slice to the next).
We will illustrate this application with two options each using the same DBN (B0, Bd)
with the difference that the first sets Tphp = 1.81 (l/(BSphp * min(TGSphp))) and rsun =
1.36 (l/(BSsun * min(TGSsun))). The effect of this is that P{E\ = T \ ?\_? = T) = 1
for all of the exploit nodes. This implies that once an attacker has successfully exploited a
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Time O Time 1 Time ?
Figure 16: The DBN Model
node, he never relinquishes this ability and the model assigns the value for all subsequent
time slices such that the node is considered exploited. Figures 1 7 and 1 8 show the intraslice
CPDs in tabular format whereas Figures 19, 20 and 21 shows the interslice CPDs.
For the second option, we assign t?1?? = 1.25 and rsun = 1.1. Although the model uses
the same intraslice CPDs, the interslice CPDs will be modified and are shown in Figures
24 and 25. Notice that the table entries are calculated using CVSS equations as explained
in section 3.2.
Suppose the objective is to calculate the probability value of an attacker successfully
exploiting sunvect for any time slice. From NVD we obtain the BS for each vulnerability as
follows: BS(addusrphp) = 7.5 and BS(sunvect) = 10.0. In this example, we consider
























































Figure 17: Intraslice CPDs for php (time slice 0)
slices, we can set them to any values from the set E={U,POC,F,H} and RL={OF,TF,W,U}
which correspond to the CVSS domain values for these metrics. To illustrate the model,
we show the results for 3 example runs of the application. The values used for each of
these runs is shown in Figure 23 for the first option and in Figure 27 for the second. The
resulting value for the probability of exploitation of sunvect for each time slice is shown


























































Figure 18: Intraslice CPDs for sunvect
5.3 Application 2: Inference of TGS Node Values
Now we consider applications where the temporal metric scores of a vulnerability are of
interest (for example, to security vendors who maintain these scores) and can be derived
from base scores and the observed TS or exploit node scores (determined from reported
security incidents involving that vulnerability).
More formally, in this case, the DBN (B0, Bd) defines a DAG including the same in-
traslice arcs as in Case Study 1, however, the interslice arcs now link some or all of the
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Figure 19: Interslice CPDs for PHP rphp = l/{BSphp * TGSphp)
temporal metric nodes (ie. E or RL) depending on the objective and upon which nodes are
unobservable. The model for this application is illustrated in Figure 28. The exploit nodes
are observed at regular time intervals or time slices. The intraslice relationships remain
unchanged and only the interslice arcs change.
We shall infer only the E metric, although the model itselfcan also be used to infer other
temporal metric node scores. Also, we shall rely on a simple choice regarding the transition
probabilities of the E metric value from one time slice to the next. In this application, the
exploit nodes are observable. That is, for each time slice, the value of each exploit node is
observed to be either {T,F} (exploited or not). The values of the E metric can be inferred
which can then be matched to a value in {{/, POC, F, H}.
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php. php.
Figure 20: Interslice CPDs for SunVect Part 1 rsun = l/(BSsun * TGSsun)
Definition 7 Given an acyclic attack graph G(E U C, Rn U Ri), we define a two-slice
temporal Bayes net(2TBN) (Bq, Bd) based on a DAG in which the set ofobservable nodes
O = {E} and the set ofunobservable node U = {Ee, Erl, Erc}-
The inter-slice probabilities P(EEt | EE ) = s are to be assigned using user-defined
values. In our case, we shall define s in Figure 29.
5.3.1 An Example
To vendors who create and maintain the CVSS databases, temporal scores may be unob-
servable and must be estimated from base scores and reported security incidents. We now
consider the case where the E temporal metrics for each vulnerability are unobservable.
In the previous case, the model was able to observe the E metric values and then infer the
Exploit node values. In this case, we have the reverse situation. The goal in this case is
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php. php,
Figure 21 : Interslice CPDs for SunVect Part 2 rsun = \/{BSsun * TGSsun)
to update the E Temporal Metric values for maintaining the CVSS databases based on the
DBN model.
Figure 30 illustrates the DBN model for this case where only the unobservable E metric
vertices are linked from one time slice to the next. The interpretation is that the value of
the E metric in the previous time slice will have an impact on determining the likelihood
of which state the E metric vertex will be in during the subsequent time slices. Figures 17
and 1 8 show the intraslice CPDs in tabular format whereas Figure 29 shows the interslice
CPDs.
Suppose reported security incidents show that that addusrphp and sunvect have been
observed to have the values indicated in Figure 31 for 5 time slices. The DBN model can
then infer the probabilistic scores for each of the E nodes. For example, in time slice 2,






















Figure 22: P(sunvect) = T at Each Time Slice rphp = l/(BSphp * TGSphp) and rs.
l/(BSsun * TGSsun)
that it is ten times more likely that Esun3 is in state U (Unproven) than in state H (High).
5.4 Case Study
Now we apply the DBN model to a more complex case to demonstrate its potential by
examining the network from Figure 2. For this case, we will apply the methodology de-
scribed in Application 1 ofthe model. That is, we assume E and RL are observable and the
objective is to infer the values of the exploit nodes. Specifically, the example will examine
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Figure 23: 3 Sample Runs t???? = l/(BSphp * TGSphp) and rsun = l/(BSsun * TGSsun)
Figure 32 shows the corresponding DBN produced by GeNIe [10]. Figure 33 shows
2 slices unrolled of the corresponding DBN network. We will run our DBN for 10 time
slices and show the changing values for P(localJbof(2)) = T. The example uses the
following values as the Base Metric Score for each vulnerability: ftp_rhosts=0.8, rsh=0.9,
sshd_bof=0. 1 and local_bof=0. 1 . Figure 34 shows the results when E in all time slices is
set to U and RL to TF.
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Php¡ ¡21
PhPn RLphPi Ephpi PhPn RLphPi Ephpi
OF 0.4454 0.5546 OF
POC 0.4127 0.5873 POC
0.3801 0.6199
0.3475 0.6525
TF 0.4262 0.5738 TF
POC 0.3925 0.6075 POC
0.3587 0.6413
0.325 0.675
W 0.3944 0.6056 W




POC 0.325 0.6750 POC
0.2875 0.7125
0.25 0.750
Figure 24: Interslice CPDs for PHP rphp = 1.25
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Case Study 1: Run 1
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Figure 30: The DBN Model
Time
Slice




U* 0.736 0.099 0.088 0.077 0.814 0.083 0.063 0.040
W* 0.581 0.157 0.166 0.096 0.705 0.135 0.111 0.049
W* 0.441 0.185 0.239 0.134 0.612 0.174 0.152 0.062
TF* TF* 0.341 0.192 0.285 0.183 0.509 0.203 0.202 0.086
OF* OF* 0.268 0.186 0.312 0.234 0.40 0.212 0.258 0.130
'¡Denotes Observed Value
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This section first describes the implementation of tools supporting the proposed models,
and then studies the scalability of the models through simulation studies. The simulations
were performed on a PC equipped with one Intel Core 2 Duo 2 GHz CPU, 4 GB of RAM,
Microsoft Windows Vista (64 bits). For graph rendering we use the GraphViz visualization
package [22]. For development, Netbeans 5.5 and jdkl .6.0_01 are used. Simulation studies
were conducted in lieu of experiments due to the lack of availability of publicly available
data sets of real world attack graphs.
6.1 Simulation Environment
In order to examine the scalability of the proposed models, several tools have been imple-
mented or used. These tools together form the simulation environment in which our studies
were conducted. We describe their purposes and details in this section.
Attack Graph Simulator The Random Attack Graph Simulator is a simulator implemented
in [44] consisting of a set of Java programs that can generate random attack graphs
based on given parameters, including the number of total AG nodes and the distribu-
tion ofvarious dependency relationships, such as the ratio of initial conditions among
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all conditions. These parameters can be selected in order to generate a vast range of
AG with varying characteristics to simulate attack graphs of different networks. As
depicted in Figure 35, the simulator takes as inputs the total number of exploit nodes
to be generated, the number of condition nodes in the attack graph, and the distribu-
tion of conditional dependency relationships. The simulator then generates an attack
graph in the .dot format, which is the language used by the GraphViz visualization
package [22].
No. of exploits (e)
No. of conditions (c)
Random Attack Graph
Generator
Attack Graph in .dot format
Parent Distribution Mode:
{Normal,Random, Initial Conditions}
Figure 35: Attack Graph Generator
Security Metric Calculator (Polaris) Developed for this thesis, the Security Metric Cal-
culator named Polaris is a software program written in Java for applying security
metrics to given attack graphs. From the .dot attack graph files loaded into the pro-
gram, this application generates the annotated graphs by retrieving the CVSS scores
from the NVD files also loaded into the program and assigning a probabilistic score
to each node. The program has two modes as shown in Figure 36. In the, probabil-
itypropagation mode, the program will compute the overall probability of achieving
the goal state using the probability propagation method introduced in 3.4. In the BN
mode, the simulator will compute the BN model of the given attack graph and gen-
erate the CPTs for all nodes of the AG and the .xdsl file, which can subsequently
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be loaded into the GeNIe software program [10] for visualizing the BN model and
performing inference.




Calculate Mode:{Propagate or BN}
Figure 36: Simulator - Security Metric Calculator (Polaris)
BN Attack Graph Analyzer (Sirius) Sirius is a second software application developed
for this thesis. As shown in Figure 37 it takes as input a specified list of BN attack
graph models generated by Polaris (.xdsl files), and processes them in a batch in order
to generate useful statistics in a comma separated value text file. This file can then be
analyzed by any numerical analysis tool (such as Microsoft Excel). For the purpose
of this thesis, the output allows us to study the variations in several characteristics
of the proposed BN Attack Graph models. In particular, we will show later in this
thesis, simulation results of the growth of BN attack graph model sizes with regards
to the size of attack graphs, which are produced by Sirius.
Graphical Network Interface (GeNIe) GeNIe is a development environment for build-
ing graphical decision-theoretic models [10] developed at the Decision Systems Lab-
oratory, University of Pittsburgh. GeNIe is implemented in Visual C++ based on the
MFC (Microsoft Foundation Classes). GeNIe allows for building BN models of any
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Security Metric Calculator
_? Network Security Metric
"*" ComputatioriTime
"*¦ Memory Requirement
-^. XDSL File for Genie Application
Comma separated value file
Characteristics of BN nodes, edges, cpt values etc
Figure 37: Simulator - BN Data Analyzer (Sirius)
size and complexity, limited only by the capacity of the operating memory of the
computer. GeNIe is a developer environment which produces models that can be
embedded or analyzed by any application, such as our simulator.
Graph Visualization Software (Graphviz) Graphviz is an open source graph visualiza-
tion software [22]. It includes several graph layout programs. It also has web and
interactive graphical interfaces, and auxiliary tools, libraries, and language bindings
that make it easy for us to visualize attack graphs. The Graphviz layout programs
take descriptions of graphs in a simple text language with .dot extension, and pro-
duce diagrams in formats such as Postscript or images.
6.2 Simulation Results
The main objective of our simulation studies is to examine the scalability of the proposed
models. Although general purpose BN-based models are known to have scalability issues,
our observation is that our proposed models are a special class of BNs in the following
sense. That is, only a small portion of the conditional probabilities in the BNs are non-
trivial and employed to model the logic relationships between exploits and conditions,
whereas all other conditional probabilities have the value 0 and thus can be disregarded
in storing and analyzing the models. Therefore, through optimizing the storage and analy-
sis techniques in our tools, we expect our models to possess scalability properties that are
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List of .xdsl files
BN Data Analyzer
feasible for implementation when handling attack graphs with node distributions approxi-
mating those that can be realistically encountered in real world cases. In the following, we
shall present results to confirm this conjecture. In all of our experiments, we use AG size
for the total number of nodes (exploit or condition) in a given AG, and we use BN size for
the total number of non-zero conditional probability values (since we do not store the zero
values).
BN Size as a Function of AG Size - Normal Distribution For this experiment, the AG gen-
erator is set to use a normal distribution for the dependency relationships between
exploits and conditions in the AG. Specifically, for this experiment, we have: about
70% ofthe nodes have 4 incoming edges and 4 outgoing edges, 10% have 1 incoming
edge and 4 outgoing edges, 10% have 2 incoming edges and 3 outgoing edges and
the remaining 10% have 3 incoming edges and 2 outgoing edges. Figure 38 shows
the BN size as a function of the AG size and Figure 39 shows the size of the physical
file used to store BN models (.xdsl file) as a function of the AG size.
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AG Size (Number of Nodes}
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Figure 39: BN File Size as a Function of AG Size: Normal Distribution
From these results, we can conclude that unlike in a general purpose BN model, the
number of non-trivial conditional probability values in our BN models does not increase
exponentially in the size of the DAG representing the BN (that is, attack graph in our case).
The file size actually increases in an approximate linear trend and can be easily managed
with modern computers. Therefore, our models can potentially be applied to large networks
(however, the generation of attack graphs for large networks has its own scalability issue,
which is outside the scope of this thesis).
To show the scalability of our models for attack graphs with different characteristics,
Figure 40 and 41 show similar results with dependency relationships that are uniformly
distributed. Similar conclusions can be drawn for such attack graphs, that is, our BN-based
model is still relatively scalable.
Finally, we study the scalability of our models for attack graphs with different struc-
tures. For this experiment, we set the AG generator to fix the total number of nodes in the
AG to be 60 but vary the ratio of initial conditions (that is, conditions that are not post-
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Figure 40: BN Model Size as a Function of AG Size: Uniform Distribution
the ratio of initial conditions. Figure 43 shows the file size (.xdsl file storing the BNs))
as a function of the ratio of initial conditions. These results show that although the struc-
ture of attack graphs does have an impact on the size of the BN models, the change is not
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Figure 41 : BN Model File Size as a Function of AG Size: Uniform Distribution
60 Nodes
0.3 0.4 0.5 Oi
Initial Conditions: % of Nodes
0.B
Figure 42: BN Model Size as a Function of AG Size: Initial Conditions
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BO Nodes
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Initial Conditions: % of Nodes
Figure 43: BN Model File Size as a Function of AG Size: Random Distribution
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis has pointed out two limitations in existing network security metrics and scoring
systems, that is, the lack of consideration of the inter-dependency between exploits and the
lack of support for temporal factors. This thesis then proposed a novel BN-based model for
addressing such limitations. Specifically, it was shown that BN and DBN can be derived
from given AGs and CVSS metric values. The BN model could effectively handle cases
where existing approaches to network security metrics fail. The DBN model could be used
for useful analysis of the constantly changing security aspects of a network. The fact that
our metrics were based on the standard CVSS scores leads to actionable knowledge. The
research also provides hints for enhancing the CVSS standard to include mechanisms for
combining individual scores and for adjusting temporal metrics based on observed network
incidents.
Future research will continue to refine our approach using DBNs to encompass more
properties of the temporal metrics established in the CVSS in order to develop a more
accurate model. Future research will also examine how the model can be refined to take
into consideration the environmental factors of CVSS. We will study the application of the
proposed model for hardening a vulnerable network with the least cost. Finally, we will
strive to implement and evaluate the proposed models in real world applications.
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Publications related to this thesis are the following:
• M. Frigault, L.Wang, A.Singhal and S. Jajodia. Measuring Network Security Using
Bayesian Network-Based Attack Graphs. In Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE Interna-
tional Wortehop on Security, Trust andPrivacyfor Software Applications (STPSA '08),
2008.
• M. Frigault, L. Wang, A, Singhal and S. Jajodia. Measuring Network Security Using
Dynamic Bayesian Networks. In Proceedings of the 4th Worfahop on Quality of
Protection (QoPW), October 2008.
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